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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY,

)

~

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)

VSo

BARBARA BRUNDAGE, RAY H. IVIE,
and Jo RULON MORGAN,

~
)

Defendants-Respondents,

Case Noo

18288

)

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

~

Defendant-Appellanto

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an insurance arbitration action construing
Section 31-41-11, U.C.A. 19530

Respondent Barbara Brundage brought

a personal injury action against an insured of appellant Allstate
Insurance Company, hereinafter Allstate, which was reduced to
judgment in a prior caseo

Respondents Ivie and Morgan, were Mrso

Brundages attorneys in that earlier actione

Respondent The Ohio

Casualty Insurance Company, hereinafter Ohio Casualty, was Mrs.
Brundage's no-fault insurero
DISPOSITION IN LOWER-COURT
The issue presented on appeal has been decided on at
least four different occasions, in two different divisions of the
Fourth Judicial District Court.
case of Brundage vs

0

On September 15, 1977, in the

Kernan (Civil No. 44997), Judge J. Robert

Bullock ordered that the check representing special damages be
made payable solely to respondent Brundage and her attorneyso
- 1 -
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On November 18, 1980, in the case of The Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company vso Barbara Brundage, et al (Civil Noo 47361),
Judge George Eo Ballif granted respondent Brundage and her attorneys sunnnary judgment against respondent Ohio Casualty, claiming
that Ohio's sole remedy was in arbitration with appellant Allstate
Insurance

Company~

On January 20, 1982, Judge Bullock denied a Rule 60(b)
motion by appellant Allstate to amend the original verdict pursuant
to a motion for relief from judgment in the prior action (Civil
Noo 44997)0

This decision was based on res judicata, and a cons-

truction of Rule 60(b)o
Appellant Allstate then cross-claimed against Brundage
and her attorneys in Civil Noo 473610

This action was dismissed by

Judge Ballif on the 18th day of January, 19820
Although respondent Brundage and her attorneys were no
longer before the Court, further motions of Allstate required
Judge Ballif to reiterate the dismissal (in Civil No. 47361) on the
27th

day of January, 1982.
No error has been assigned in Civil No. 44997, except

as presented in Civil Noo 47361.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan would request the
Court to dismiss Allstate's appeal as being untimely, governed by
res judicata and collateral estoppel, and as an impermissible
collateral attacko

Respondent would also seek a denial of Allstate'i

alternative relief, seeking reversal of the Court's order setting
aside the dismissal of Ohio Casualty's complaint, in that Ohio

- 2 -
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casualty, the real party in interest, never perfected an appeal on
that ordero
Respondent Brundage and her attorneys, would further ask
that the Court uphold the orders of the Fourth Judicial District
Court, as being proper constructions of Section 31-41-11, u.c.A.

19530
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the present action, appellant Allstate seeks relief
from respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan, stemming from a judgment in the case of Brundage vso Kernan, on the 15th day of September, 19770 (R 20)
In that action, Allstate represented the liability carrier
in a personal injury action.

After a verdict had been rendered in

favor of plaintiff Brundage, the following dialogue took place
between Mro Ray Harding Ivie, Mrso Brundage's attorney, and Mr.
D. Gary Christian, an attorney for Allstate Insurance Company representing the tortfeasor, and the Court:

''MR. IVIE:

Your Honor, I would like to make a

motion to the Court at this timeo

There has been

some guestion about subrogation, and I would like
you to order the defendant in this case, the insurance company, to make the draft only to my client
and myself.
THE COURT:

Any objection to that, Mro Christian?

MR. CHRISTIAN:

Well, your Honor, I think that Mro

Ivie is entitled to thato

I don't think that if I

had any objection, it would be valid.

- 3 -
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THE COURT:

Well, then if I've got the authority

to do so, that's what I'm going to do.
MR. CHRISTIAN:

Well, Mrs o Brundage has a judgment

against Mrs. Kernan.
THE COURT:

I guess if I don't have the authority,

somebody upstairs can tell me.
MR. CHRISTI.AN: I think she's entitled to have a
draft made payable to her attorney without any other
individual or company being names thereono

I'd like

to have the Court order me to do it that way, howevero
THE COURT:

That's the order o

MRo CHRISTIAN:

THE COURT:

Thank youo

And so I say, Mrs o Lambert will prepare

the judgment on the verdicto
MR. CHRISTIAN:

Can it be recited in the judgments

that the defendant is so order to pay that judgment?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. CHRISTIAN: Thank youo"
(~hasis

added)

(R 232-234)

As the foregoing dialogue indicates, Allstate, through
their attorney Mro Christian, actually joined in the request for
the ruling which Allstate now attempts to dispute.

No error was

ever assigned to this ruling, and Allstate made no action to attack
it until over three years later, on the 9th day of February, 1981.
On that date Allstate filed a cross-claim (R 121-122) in the instant
action to hold Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys liable for those

- 4 -
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funds which Mro Christian specifically requested be delivered to
respondent at the conclusion of the original tort action. Also on
February 9th, 1981, Allstate attempted to amend that original
verdict with a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b),
in Civil Noo 449970

This latter attempt to attack the prior

judgment was rejected by the original trial court on the 20th day
of January, 1982, and no appeal was ever attempted or takeno

There-

fore, that ruling is not properly before the Court.
In addition, several facts are critical to the question
of personal jurisdiction.

The record indicates that on the 22nd

day of December, 1980, respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan were
granted a summary judgment against respondent and plaintiff below,
Ohio Casualty, stating no cause for action. (R 104)

The record

will indicate that at this time, appellant Allstate had asserted
no claims against respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan.
Thereafter, Allstate filed a "cross-claim" against
Brundage and her attorneys on the 9th day of February, 1981 (R 121).
This claim for relief was mailed to the dismissed parties, and was
never personally served. (R 123).
Thereafter, no answer to the cross-claim, nor any further
participation in the suit was made by respondent Brundage and her
attorneys.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALLSTATE IACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENTS
BRUNDAGE, IVIE AND MORGAN
The instant suit was initiated by respondent Ohio Casualty,
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against respondent Brundage.

Thereafter, the original Complaint

was amended to include Mrs. Brundage's attorneys Ivie and Morgan,
as well as Allstate, the appellant herein.
On the 22nd day of December, 1980, the Court below issued
a judgment, dismissing respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan, pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.

The judgment recited that

Ohio Casualty had "no cause for action."
At the time of that judgment, appellant Allstate had
asserted no claims against respondent Brundage and her attorneys.
Thereafter, on the 9th day of February, 1981, Allstate asserted a
"cross-claim" against Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys, who had
previously been dismissed from the suit.

This cross-claim was not

personally served upon Mrs. Brundage or her attorneys.

Rather,

the record will indicate by the attached mailing certificate to
the cross-claim that the new claim was merely mailed to an attorney
for Mrs. Brundage, by a secretary in the offices of appellant's
attorney.
The record further indicates that thereafter, respondents
Brundage, Ivie and Morgan refused to participate in the proceedingso
No answer to the cross-claim was ever filed.
ever issued.

No memorandum was

Indeed, respondents at all times following their

initial dismissal on Summary Judgment, considered themselves nonparties to the suit, in that once they had been dismissed, personal
jurisdiction had never been acquired to nrandate their further parti·
cipation.
A.

The Requirement for Personal Jurisdiction

Respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan would contend that
- 6 -
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upon the granting of their sununary judgment and the subsequent
dismissal from this suit, they became strangers to the action

0

In effect, the granting of sunnnary judgment disposed of all
claim which has been asserted against the respondents

0

Rule 14(a) U.R.C.P. 1953 provides the appropriate
guidelines for third-party practice.

That rule provides:

"At any time after connnencement of the action
a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause
a sunnnons and complaint to be served upon a eerson
not a party to the action who is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim.
against him." (Emphasis added)
Therefore, once Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys were
dismissed from the suit, and thus were no longer parties, the
proper procedure for the assertion of new claims against them
would have been in the form of a third-party complaint.

Conversely,

a cross-claim is only appropriate against a co-party to the suit.
Rule 13(f) indicates:

''A pleading may state as a cross-claim any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of
a counterclaim therein or relating to any property
that is the subject matter of the original actiono"
It is respondents' conclusion that jurisdiction was
never acquired by Allstate to present the claims which they
currently bring upon appealo

Mrs. Brundage and her attorneys

became a non-party to the action upon their dismissal, and the·
original claimant,. Ohio Casualty, made. no
ordero

attempt.~

to;;.appeal the

Thereafter, the attempt to assert a claim against Mrso
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Brundage, by merely mailing a copy of the cross-claim to her
attorneys, was inadequate to gain jurisdiction for the purposes
of Allstate's claim.
The inadequacy of Allstate's service of process, is
indicated in Rule 4(f) (2), requiring a court order for service
by mail.

That section provides:
"ocoif the party desiring service of SUimD.ons shall
file a verified petition stating the facts from
which the court determines that service by mail is
just as likely to give actual notice as service
by publication, the court may order that service
of summons shall be given by the clerk mailing a
copy of the sunnnons and complaint to the party
to be served at his address, or his last known
address. Service shall be complete ten days after
such mailing."
The record displays that proper service was never

attempted on respondents following their dismissal from the
suit.

Therefore, respondents would respectfully urge the Court

to base their decision in the current case on that lack of
personal jurisdiction.
B.

Appellant is precluded from contesting the Order of

Smnmary Judgment Dismissing Respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan.
The preceeding analysis relates to appellant's procedural
actions following the summary judgment dismissing respondents from
the instant case.

However, the record also indicates that appellant

Allstate filed a notice of intent to appeal the decision granting

Mrso Brundage's Motion for Sunnnary Judgment against Ohio Casualty.
It is respondents' contention that Allstate is precluded on alternati
grounds from appealing this judgment.
- 8 -
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Initially, it must be noted that the only claims before
the Court at the time of the judgment of dismissal were those of
respondent Ohio Casualty.

The judgment merely recited that Ohio

Casualty had no cause of action against Mrso Brundage and her
attorneyso

At that time, no claim had been asserted by Allstate.

Therefore, it would appear that Allstate has no standing to contest the dismissal of another parties' claim

0

In Redwood Gym v.

Salt Lake County Connnission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1145, (Utah 1981), the
Court stated:
"This Court does not engage, in the rendering
of advisory opinions. absent some overriding
consideration of public policy, a party must
demonstrate standing to raise an issue in order to
secure a ruling thereono"
It appears clear that Allstate does-not have standing
to contest the order of Summary;Jti.dgmento

No notice of intent

to appeal was ever filed by the party whose claim was dismissedo
Allstate's present request for a declaration of this Court that
Ohio Casualty did have a valid claim against Mrso Brundage, is to
~

allow a party to do indirectly what they could not do themselveso

W

Thus, Allstate's alternate relief for a declaratory judgment would

l~i

merely serve to avoid the strict requirements of appellate practiceo

~1:

Ohio Casualty accepted the dismissal of their claim without ever

ii

attempting to perfect their appeal,· and thus, th:e summary judgment

1~i

in favor of respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan should be consi-

'

dered res judicatao
- However, even if ·the Court upholds "che practice of
appealing the dismissal of another parties' claim, an independent

- 9 -
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reason exists for disallowing the appeal under the current circumstances o

Respondents would contend that the relief requested is

in the nature of a compulsory counterclaimo

Appellant, not having

raised that claim at the time of their initial pleading, nor seeking
leave of Court to amend their responsive pleading, are now barred
from requesting such relief.
Rule 13(a) U.R.C.P. states:

''A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the
pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the
time the action was commenced the claim was the subject
of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party
brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction
to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the
pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this
Rule 130"
Respondent interprets the foregoing language as requiring
Allstate's current claims to be asserted as a compulsory counterclaim under the statute.

The claims asserted clearly arise out of

the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the initial Complaint against

Allstate~

The claims also do not

require the presence of third-parties of whom the Court cannot
acquire jurisdiction for full adjudication.

Furthermore, at the

ti.me the action was commenced, the claim was not the subject of
any other pending action, except possibly the original action
against the tortfeasor, which respondents assert infra., was res
judicatao
- 10 -
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Therefore, the only question remaining is whether
respondents were an opposing party at the time of Allstate's
initial responsive pleading.

Respondents believe that the

issues raised by Allstate on this appeal are ample evidence
of the opposing interests of Allstate and Brundage

0

Both prongs

of Allstate's alternate request for relief are aimed at Brundage.
Following Allstate 1 s initial pleading, a "cross-claim" was
later asserted against Brundage.

It is obvious that the interests

of appellant and the respondent were adverse.
It is a well settled rule of law that the initial
caption of a case, or the alignment of the parties by the
plaintiff, is not conclusive as to their opposing interesto
Swanson Vo Traer, 354 UoS• 114.

See

For instance, in Federal

practice, for the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction,
it is conmon for the Courts to realign the parties to reflect
their opposing interests.

See Pac. Railroad Co. of Missouri v.

Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289.
It is evident from the pleadings on file herein, that
Allstate considered itself, even prior to the inception of this
action, to be an opposing party with adverse interests from
those of respondent Brundage.
Respondents conclude therefore, that no jurisdiction
was had on Mrs. Brundage following her dismissal from the action,
and that Allstate should be precluded from appealing the dismissal
of a claim in which they took no part.

Respondents therefore

consider their presence in the appellate Court a form of special
appearance, and the remainder of their argument on appeal as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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being merely an attempt to protect themselves under all
eventualities, including the possibility that the Court may
find personal jurisdiction has attached.
POINI' II
ALLSTATE 1 S APPEAL IS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER
In Point II, respondents contend that the relief
sought by Allstate is barred by the doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, timeliness for bringing an appeal, as an
impermissible attempt to utilize divisions of the same Court
to overrule decisions of fellow judges of the Court, and for
mootness.
It should be noted at the outset of this discussion
that respondents have already presented underlying facts in the
argument in the form of a ''Motion to Dismiss the Appeal," on
the grounds of timelinesso

That motion was denied by the Court

on the 7th day of September, 1982, without discussion.

Respondents

once again assert the question of timeliness in Part D of this
argument.

If the Court is of the opinion that the issue of

timeliness is foreclosed by the prior ruling on the motion, that
section should be disregarded.

However, in Parts A, B and C of

the present analysis, respondents address the questions of
res judicata and collateral estoppel, the propriety of asking
one division of a Court to overrule another, and mootness of the
appealo

While these additional arguments are based on the same

foundational facts as respondents' earlier motion, they present
independent procedural rationales for rejecting the present appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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AG

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

As the facts on appeal indicate, the present controversy
arises from an order of Judge Bullock in the case of Kernan vs 0
Brundage, (Civil No. 44997), on the 15th day of September, 1977.
That order was never appealed from and the issues remained dormant
for over three years, until the 9th day of February, 1981.

At that

ti.me, Allstate brought a Motion to Amend the Original Judgment, as
well as a cross-claim against respondent Brundage and her attorneys
in a collateral action filed before Judge Ballif.

That latter

action is currently before the Court on appeal.
Respondent would contend that the present appeal stems
from an impermissible collateral attack on the judgment rendered
by the trial court in the initial case of Kernan vs. Brundage.

To

this extent, respondent believes that the related doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppelpreclude Allstate from relitigating
questions which were decided· in the earlier suito
The distinction between these related doctrines was
discussed in the case of Searle Brothers vso Searle, 588 P.2d 689
(Utah 1978)0

There it was stated at page 690:

"In order for res judicata to apply, both suits
must involve the same parties or their privies and also
the same cause of action; and this precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as
well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior
action. If the subsequent suit involves different parties,
those parties cannot be bound by the prior judgment.
Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, arises from
a different cause of action and prevents parties and their
privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second
suit that were fully litigated in the first suito This
means that the plea of collateral estoppel can be asserted
only against a party in the subsequent suit who was also a
party or in privity with a party in the prior suitG"
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As the foregoing language indicates, a threshold question
is presented where either res judicata or collateral estoppel is
asserted.

That question requires a finding that the party against

whom the claim is asserted was either a party, or in privity with a
party, in the prior actiono

See Nielson vs. Droubay, Supreme Court

Noo 17385 Utah, Filed July 20, 19820
Respondent would urge that Allstate should be bound by the
rulings of the trial court in the initial action against their insured, on the grounds that they were at all times in privity with
their insuredo It must first be noted that Allstate retained completE
control of the litigation in the earlier action.

They selected the

attorney who represented their insured from inception to conclusion
of the action.

They were bound by contract to represent their

insured, and to pay all sums which the Court ordered, up to their
policy limit.

Furthermore, when the motion was presented to make

the check representing special damages payable only to Mrs. Brundage
and her attorneys, the motion was addressed not to the insured but
to the insurance company.
of the Court at R-232:
gation.

(By reiteration, respondent Ivie requested

"There has been some question about subro-

And I would like you to order the defendant in this case,

the insurance company, to make the draft only to my client and myself
In addition, respondent would content that special conside·
rations unique to insurance cases demand that the insurer be held in
privity with the insured in such situations.

It is a well accepted

principle of trial practice that an insurance company will not be
named as a party to an action, despite the fact that they are ulti·
mately responsible for the loss, and that they will control the
- 14 -
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litigation from its inception.

This principle is applied, despite

the traditional rights given to a third-party beneficiary to a
contract, in order to protect insurance companies from the potential
prejudicial effects which their presence in an action may have upon
a juryo

It would be a highly unjust and inequitable result, should

an insurer be allowed to use this limited protection as a means of
escaping responsibility for their actions in conducting the litigation.
In 46 C.J.S. Insurance 1252, the principle is articulated:

:[

''Where an insurer was notified of a pending action
against the insured on an injury or liability covered
by the policy, a judgment against the insured in such
action is conclusive on the insurer as to all questions
determined therein and material in an action against it
on ~he policy; and the insured is also concluded as to
matters established in such actiono"

1.[~

In Utah, several specific tests have been established to
determine privity for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppelo

The Court in Tanner vso Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 960 (Utah 1943)

stated that privity means "one whose interests has been legally
represented at the time."

In Searle Brothers vso Searle, supra,

the Court stated:
I~

"The legal definition of a person in privity
with another, is a person so identified in interest
with another that he represents the same legal righto"

l~

Respondent would content that under the definitions and
principl..es. oU'tlined above, Allstate must be held to be· in privity
with their insured in the present situation.
I~

Certainly, Allstate

being responsible for any potential judgment, represented the same
legal right as their insured in the action.

Their contractual right

to retain the attorney of their choice in defense of the insured
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would obviously indicate that their interest had been legally
representedo

See also Camppell vs. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037, 1040

(Utah 1979)0
Once Allstate's privity to their insured has been
established, it is then necessary to apply the rules governing
res judicata and collateral estoppel.

The elements of res judicata

were articulated by the Utah Court in the case of Olsen vso Board
of Education of the Granite School District, 571 P.2d 1336 (Utah
1977)0

The Court indicated:
"The parties thereto are concluded as to all
matters that were put in issue, or might have been
put in issue, or were necessarily implied in the
decision ••• The doctrine renders a final judgment, on
the merits, by a court of competent jurisdiction, conclusive upon the parties and is a bar to subsequent
litigation of the same issues.
The general rule of law is that a judgment may
not be drawn in question in a collateral proceeding
and an attack upon a ju4gment is regarded as collateral
if made when the judgment is offered as the basis of a
claim in a subsequent proceeding.
The Restatement of Judgments (1942) Section 11,
Comment A, defines a collateral attack as follows:
Where a judgment is attacked in other
ways than by proceedings in the original action
to have it vacated or r~vised or modified or by
a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforcement, the attack is a "Collateral Attack."
Applying the foregoing language to the facts at hand,

respondents conclude (1) that the issue currently presented not
only might have been put in issue, but was in fact; (2) the trial
court's decision in the original action against the insured became
a final judgment, on the merits, by a Court of competent jurisdic·
tion; (3) that the present action is a collateral attack, within

- 16 -
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the meaning of Olsen, supra, in that it was attacked in other ways
than by proceedings in the original action to have it vacated or
revisedo

Furthermore, it is critical as to this latter point to

note that Allstate also attacked the judgment in the original
action, to have it vacated or revised

0

The doctrine of collateral estoppel is likewise applicable
to the case at hando

The Utah Supreme Court has recently upheld

the requirement that collateral estoppel cannot be used as a sword
against a party who was not present in the earlier litigationo See
Nielson vs. Droubay, supra,

However, privity dictates that this

defense would only be available to Ohio Casualty, and not Allstateo
Furthermore, Ohio Casualty initially filed an action against respondent Brundage and her attorneys, but upon losing on Sumnary
Judgment, failed to take any of the steps necessary to perfect an
appeal.

Therefore, collateral estoppel should be applicable in the

instant case, regardless of the fact that a stranger to the proceedings
is present.

Allstate's privity in the earlier action is sufficient.

The essential elements of collateral estoppel are indicated
in Searle Brothers vs. Searle, supra, wherein the Court proposes
three tests as being determinative:
(1) was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in question?
(2) was there a final judgment on the merits? (3) was
the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privity with the party to the prior adjudication?"
Respondent would maintain that the answer to all three
of the above questions should be answered "yes"o
has been addressed earlier in this pointo

The latter question

The first question is

answered by examining the transcript of the original tort action,

- 17 -
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where respondent Ivie identified the question as being subrogation,
and moving for the exact relief which Allstate claims as error in th
current actiono

Question (2) has never been disputed by appellant

or any other party.
Finally, the Searle Court proposed a fourth test in applyi
collateral estoppelo

The final question remaining is:

''Was the issue in the first case competently,
fully, and fairly litigated?"
Respondent believes that the answer is yeso

The record

will indicate that respondent Ivie clearly identified the issue
presented by the motion as being one of subrogationo

Thereafter,

the Court left no doubts that it was willing to entertain any
objections which Allstate's attorney, Mr. Christian, might choose
to asserto

Instead of objecting, Mro Christian actively joined in

the request.

Respondents conclude that the only inference which

may be drawn from the motion in the earlier tort action, is that
the Court provided every opportunity for Allstate to have a
competent, full, and fair determination of the matter of which
they now seek to contest five years latero
Respondent believes therefore, that the doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata clearly apply to bar the
present actiono
Bo

The Functioning of Divisions Within the Court

Respondent also believes that Allstate has improperly
attempted to have one division of the Fourth Judicial District
Court overrule another.

In Point III of appellant's brief they
- 18 -
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claim that:
"In the event that trial court did not err
in setting aside the judgment of dismissal in favor
of Allstate, the court erred in not amending the
personal injury ~udgment
to reduce it by the amount
of PIP payments. 1
It is important to reiterate at this time that Allstate's
assault on the original personal injury judgment-- occurred in two
fonns of the Fourth Judicial District Court.

Allstate brought an

action-before the original judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b):

Allstate

also filed a cross-claim in the present action against Brundage, Ivie
and Morgan, who had already been dismissed from that suit.
In· the first action, Judge Bullock refused:to amend the
judgment, on the grounds that it was not a clerical mistake, but
a mistake o.f law, and therefore was not subject to modification at
1~:
1!i

that late date.

Allstate made no attempt to;- appeal this order, and

indeed the record will indicate a complete vacuum as it relates to
the attempt to amend the judgment before the original trial courto
An examination of the cross-claim will also indicate that
no attempt was made to amend the judgment there.

Rather, the cross-

claim states:
1.

First cause of action:

"Since the Court wrongfully ordered Allstate,
through its insured Kerman to pay Brundage and her
attorneys for damages wnic& Brundage had, heretofore,
received no-fault benefits, and Allstate accordingly
complied, cross-defendants Brundage and her attorneys
are liable to Allstate in the amount of $6,651.04 •• o"
ti!

2.

Second cause of action:

"Cross-defendants Brundage and her attorneys
have been unjustly enriched ••• "
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3o

Third cause of action:

"Cross-claimant seeks declaratory relief from
the Court as to its rights under the law to be r.rotected from paying twice for the same damageo'«> o '
Obviously, none of the relief prayed for in the crossclai.m requested the original trial court to amend the judgment.
Rather, as the first cause of action clearly indicates, Allstate
attempted to collect damages, by using Judge Ballif's Court to
appeal the prior ruling of Judge Bullock.

Nowhere is the request

presented to amend the judgment itself o
Two conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing analysiso
First, the refusal of the Court to amend the personal injury
judgment by the amount of PIP payments is not properly before the
Court.

At no ti.me did Allstate indicate their intention of

appealing this matter.

Second, Allstate's actions constitute an

impermissible attempt to induce one division of the Fourth Judicial
District to overrule anothero
The respondentswould contend that Judge Ballif's deference
to the earlier rulings of the Fourth Judicial District Court, sitting
in its different divisions, was a necessary and proper application
of judicial procedure.

Initially, it must be noted, that divisions

of the Court are established for the purposes of judicial convenience
and efficiency, and are not so divided for the purposes of forum
shopping or fortttn hopping.

In 21 c.J.s. Courts, 137, 210, it is

stated:

''A court which is divided into divisions or
departments remains a unit notwithstanding; actions
brought in any of the departments are in effect in the
same court, and decisions and ~udgments therein are
rendered by the same tribunal. '
- 20 -
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The citation continues at 211, to indicate:
"The court remains a unit notwithstanding such
a division; and where the constitution vests the
power in the court and not in departments which
are merely for convenience, the judges hoid but one
and the same court whether sitting separately or
together. Actions brought in any of such departments are in effect in the same court, and decisions
and judgments therein are rendered by the same
tribunalo•o"
Furthermore, the fact that an action is heard before
different divisions of the same court, does not affect the prior
decisions of a different judge.

At 21 C.J.s. Courts, 137, 213

it is stated:

''A case originally assigned to one division or
department may be transferred to another ••• but such
transfer does not affect previous orders in the case
made in the department to which it then belonged •• o"
The reasons for the rules outlined above is readily
apparento

The constitution of this state, as well as our sister

jurisdictions, provides for effective methods of appellate reviewo
However, where a party attempts to·relitigate the same.issues in
different divisions of a single district court, the ultimate
result is a complete breakdown of finality, clarity, and consistency in trial court determinations.
Respondentswould urge that Judge Ballif 's rulings be
upheld to the extent that they reflect a

refu~al

to overrule

a different division of the.Fourth District Courto

c.

Allstate has Waived its Right to Appeal by Voluntary

Paym.ent of the Judgment
Respondents

woul~

further contend that Allstate's
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voluntary payment of the judgment in the initial action against
their insured tortfeasor, constitutes a waiver of their
appeal.

r~ght

to

It is important to note at the outset, that respondent

relies on the same considerations of an insurer's privity with
their insured, that were argued under the res judicata analysis,
above.

Once that fact is established, Allstate's voluntary pay-

ment of funds representing special damages, serves as a waiver of th
right to appeal the order of the Court which mandated the payment
of those damageso
This rule of law is rooted in several different legal
foundations.

In 39 ALR 2nd 157, it is stated:

"In determining whether payment of, or
compliance with, a judgment deprieves the defeated
party of the right to appeal, the Courts proceed
on various theories. They ascertain whether payment
or performance of the judgment constitutes a waiver
or estoppel, these terms sometimes being used interchangeably, or a release of errors, or an acquiessence
in the judgment, or whether payment or performance
renders the controversy moot."
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the general rule of
law that payment of a judgment bars the right to appeal, founding
their decision on the principle of mootness.

In Hollingsworth vs.

Farmers Insurance Company, et al, Supreme Court No. 17828, Utah,
filed September 7, 1982, the Court_ stated:
"Generally, when a judgment creditor accepts
payment and executes a satisfaction of judgment the
controversy becomes moot and the right of appeal is
barred."
See also Merhish vso H. A. Folsom & Associates, Utah 646
P.2d 731 (1982); Clive vs. Mason, Utah 605 P.2d 763 (1980); and
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Jensen

Eddy, Utah 514 Po2d 1142 (1973)

Vo

0

In addition, while Hollingsworth would indicate that
mootness is the touchstone of the doctrine, a parties' actions
as constituting a waiver, also are significant.

The decision

stated:
''Any intention IDS may have had to preserve
the right of appeal is wholly inconsistent with
its action. (in satisfying the judgment)."
Therefore, respondent believes that the actions of
Allstate's attorney in soliciting the ruling of Judge Bullock in
the original tort action, should serve as a waiver of their right
to appealo
However, the Hollingsworth case also states:
"The general rule does not necessarily prevent
an appeal as to separate and independent claims if
it is shown that a controversy remains in regard
thereto."
The nature of the claims in Hollingsworth, involved
H

money damages, as well as the rights to real propertyo

Appellant

~l

accepted the award of money damages, while later choosing to appeal

~

the question as to property rights.

#

these questions were not divisible, and thus review was mooto

The Court there held that

In stating that a judgment may become divisible, and thus
subject to appeal despite partial satisfaction, the Hollingsworth
Court cited the case of Jensen v. Eddy, Utah 514 P.2d 1142 (1973).
In that case the Court indicated:
·''We are in agreement with> the general rule that
if a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted,
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and a judgment satisfied, the controversy has become
moot and the right to appeal is waived. This is
based upon the reasoning that when a controversy
has come to rest the litigation should cease. But
~ertinent to the problem here is an ancient aphorism:
If the reason for the rule is not present, the rule
does not apply.' Therefore, the general rule just
stated does not usually prevent an appeal as to
separate and independent claims where the controversy
has not so come to rest. If a judgment is entered as
to one part of a controversy which is separate and
distinct from another part, and the disposition of
the latter cannot affect the disposition of the
former} a party may accept the money or property to
which he is entitled, and not be deemed to waive his
right to appeal as to other independent claims which
the court refused to grant."
Applying the above language to the instant facts, it
becomes apparent that a division of the issues here would be
inappropriate.

First, it should be noted that Allstate did not

pay some of the amount of damages, while preserving their right
to appeal on others.

Rather, they paid the entire judgment

reflecting special and general damageso

This occurred in full_

light of the language of respondent Ivie's motion, that a question
as to subrogation existed.
to rest.

Further, the controversy here had come

After Mrs. Brundage had received the compensation for

her injuries, Allstate waited three years before relitigating the
issue.
Respondents would respectfully contend that the reasoning
of Jensen

Ve

Eddy, supra, is controlling; ''That when a controversy

has come to rest.litigation should cease."
It is sincerely believed that when viewed through the
spectacles of the private individual who might be compelled to pro·
duce a large fund, stennning from a controversy which a reasonable
- 24 -
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person would believe had become final, that the reason for the
rule is undoubtedly present.
D.

Timeliness of the Appeal

Respondents have earlier made a motion to dismiss
the appeal on the grounds that it is untimely
denied by the Court without connnento

0

This motion was

Because respondents are

uncertain as to the reason the motion was denied, the question
is presented at this time, so that the Court may have the
benefit of further consideration of the matter.

However, should

the Court be of the opinion that the denial of the motion is
conclusive as to the issue, this portion of respondents' brief
may be disregardedo
In sunnnary, the facts upon which this argument is
based are identical to the facts considered aboveo

Respondents'

contention is that the issue presented by Allstate on appeal
is identical to the question presented to the original trial
Court in the action against Allstate's insuredo
It is respondents' position that if Allstate disagreed
with the ruling in the original tort action, they should have
appealed from that holding instead of waiting three years and
attempting a collateral attack.
Rule 73(a) U.RoC P. 1953, requires:
5

"When an appeal is permitted from a district
court to the Supreme Court, the time within which
an appeal may be taken shall be one month from
from the entry of the judgment or order appealed
from unless a shorter time is provided by law,
ex_cept "that upon a showing -of excusable neglect
based on a failure of a party to learn· of· the
entry of the judgment the district court in any .
action may extend the time for appeal not exceeding
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one month from the expiration of the original time
herein prescribedo"
Respondents believe that the failure of Allstate to
satisfy the Rule 73 time limitations for appealing to this
Court is evident from the face of the recordo
POINT III
APPELLANT ALLSTATE'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS THROUGH
ARBITRATION.
The issue which appellant Allstate seeks to litigate
in the current appeal, is one which has been extensively before
the Utah Court; ioeo an insurers right to subrogation under the
Utah No-Fault Insurance Acto
In order to properly evaluate the issue presented,
it is necessary to put the facts of this case in a time frame
of the judicial pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court.

It

must be noted that the initial trial against the tortfeasor
as well as the subsequent payment to Mrs. Brundage of the damages
assigned by the jury, occurred prior to the case of Allstate
~'

v~

Utah 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), and the subsequent decisions

of the Court.
However, it is of critical importance to note that all
events which are the subject of this appeal occurred years after
the case of Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783
(Utah, 1972).
A.

The Law Prior to Allstate vs. Ivie

The Barnes case established the universal practice in
cases of insurance subrogation, until the Ivie decision of 19800
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.

The Barnes case articulated·

"If the settlement were intended to include
plaintiff's prior medical expenses two drafts
should have been issued, one to (i~surer) and
(person receiving benefits) jointly and one to
(that person), alone."
(Modified)
·
The procedure of issuing two separate checks in satisfaction of a personal injury claim, was utilized by virtually
every liability insurer in the State of Utah.

Indeed, this

practice produced the precise controversy in Allstate v. Ivie,
suprao

Yet, as the records will indicate, Allstate readily

agreed at the trial at the original tort action to issue a check
to the insured alone, ignoring the rights of her no-fault insurer.
This occurred even though Mrs. Brundage's attorney prefaced his
motion with the statement that a subrogation issue existed.
This latter fact is critical.when viewed through the
spectacles of Transamerica v. Barnes• supra.· The Barne-s case made it
clear that where the liability insurer has notice of a subrogation
interest, and yet fails to issue,the two separate drafts, they
are guilty of a fraud upon the subrogated insurer and are liable
to that insurer despite any payment to the injured plaintiff.
The Barnes decision states:
"If the settlement were made with knowledge,
actual or constructive, of plaintiff's subrogation
right, such settlement and release is a fraud on
the. insurer aad -will not affect·. the insurer 1 s right
of subro ation as a ainst tfie tort-feasor or his
insurance carrier.
mp asis a
At first blush, the language-in Barnes which requires
r. ~:

the .. liability~ insurer_,' to.~ make: a· dou9le '"payment --appea-E's" quite, hars ho::~ ·
However,. earlier in the decision . Chief Justice ·Callister provides
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the touch stone that justifies holding the liability insurer
and not the injured plaintiff liable for this sum.

The Chief

Justice states:
"Subrogation is not permitted where it will
work any injustice to others. To entitle one to
subrogation, the equities of one's case must be
strong, as equity will, in general, relieve only those
who could not have relieved themselves."
In the instant case, it is clear that Allstate could
have objected to the motion proposed by Mrs. Brundage's attorney,
and therefore have protected their interest.

Rather, they

acquiessed in the motion and even requested that the Court make
such an ordero

It is beyond cavil that Allstate, through proper

objections, could have relieved themselves by obtaining the
same pragmatic remedy as they now seek five years after the factQ
In his ciriticsm of the majorities opinion in Ivie,
supra, Justice Crockett found this exact interpretation of
Barnes, supra, to be controlling.

·The Justice stated:

"In treating a similar situation in the case
of Transamert,ca Ins. Co 2 y. Batnes, this Court
stated that ~if the settlement were intended to
include plaintiff's prior medical expenses, two
drafts should have been issuedo One to plaintiff
and defendant jointly and one to defendant alone.'
That is the exact procedure followed by (the
liability carrier) in this instance."
Thus, it would appear that an even more compelling
reason exists in the present situation than existed in Ivie,
supra, where two checks were issuedo
However, an interpretation of the above quoted
language still presents the question of whether or not Mrso Brundage
would suffer a greater injustice than Allstate under these facts,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-28-

!~

It is respectfully su.8mitted that Allstate, having an extensive
nationwide network of professionals who deal exclusively in the
area of insurance law, was in a far better situation to protect
their interestso

Furthermore, it is the inherent nature of the

insurance industry to spread risks of monetary losses.
Conversely, Mrs. Brundage is a single individual.
Here sole connection to the insurance industry is being the
unfortunate victim of a tortious drivero

Her ability to spread

the risk of loss extends from her purse to the cookie jar.
Allstate may articulate the injustice of double
liability.

However, their-argument must be tempered by the

injustice to the human condition which Allstate attempts to
inflict.

It is respectfully submitted that to require Mrso

Brundage, more than five-years after.leaving.the Court of law,
to produce the fund of thousands of dollars solely due to
Allstate's failure to object, is repugnant to the very foundation
of equi. ty.

Mrs. Brundage is left only to' echo· the words of

Barnes, supra:

"Subrogation is not permitted where it will work

any injus tlce to others."

B.

Allstate Vo Ivie Applied

The law of insurance subrogation in the State of Utah
was
Act.

rewr~tten

:by the adoption· of tJne.utah·No-Fault:Insurance

The Bar of the State of Utah underwent seven years

of~

adjustment,. during which time Mrs o Brundage 1 s judgment. was
rendered, until 1980 when the· Utah: Supreme· Court delive·red its
cpinion in Allstate v. Ivie, suprao Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Ivie case mirrors the current situation, with
two important distinctions.

First, making the check payable

jointly to Mrs. Ivie and her no-fault carrier, was the unilateral
act of the liability insurer, and not pursuant to Court order.
Second, Mrs. Ivie's claim concluded with a settlement rather
than a judgment of the Court.
The initial distinction goes to the issue of
res judicata and collateral estoppel, which is treated elsewhere
in this brief.

However, Allstate places great reliance in the

second factual distinction.

According to Allstate, the fact

that special damages are easily discernable from an examination
of the judgment supports their right to reinbursement.

Allstate

maintains that the Court's decision in Ivie, supra, was due
solely to the Court's inability to discern what items the settlement was intended to include.
Initially, Mrs. Brundage-would suggest that this
distinction is a double-edged sword.

The judgment of the Court

in the instant case is not only apparent to the Justices of
this Court, it was undoubtedly crystal clear to Allstate's
attorney at the trial against the tort-feasor.
cannot claim as it is argued in

~'

Thus, Allstate

supra, that the ambiguity

surrounding the payment of the claim contemplated satisfying the
subrogation right of the.no-fault insurer.

Allstate's failure

to object once again raises the spector of fundamental principles
of equity discussed in Barnes, supra.
Furthermore, Mrs. Brundage would maintain that the
Court in Ivie, supra, did in fact recognize the payment of special
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damages to the tort victim, but resolved the equities against
the liability carrier, who is in the best position to prevent
the situation which occurred.

The Court stated:

"Thus the tort victim's recovery from the
liability insurer cannot be reduced by the PIP
payments. If the victim's recovery be reduced
by the amount of the PIP payments by granting his
no-fault insurer a right of subrogation, it is the
no-fault insurer who receives double recovery. This
is so because the insurer receives a premium for
the benefits, and then receives full reimbursement,
while the liability insurance available to recompense
the victim is depleted by payments for which the liability insurer is not responsible- to the victim.''
Respondents do not mean to suggest that the

~

case

didn't provide that the tort victim should not seek to be compensated for special damages already paid by the'PIP carrier.

Had

Mrs. Brundage's trial occurred three ·years later, after the decision in

~'

supra, was announced, no such recovery would have

been co.ntemplatedo
the Court in

~'

However, it is respectfully submitted that
supra, chose to resolve the equities in favor

of the private citizen and against the liability insurer, who was
charged by statute to satisfy the myriad requirements of the Utah
No· Fault Insurance Act. as a condition· ~precedent to doing business
in this jurisdiction.
That the Ivie Court was aware that the sum obtained by
the tort victim included special damages, is clearly evidenced by
the vigorous dissent of now Chief Justice Hall.

Justice Hall

stated at page 1205:
~-

'.'The .. pure and. simple facts of -this -case .are-· · ~
wholly supportive of the summary judgment appealed
from. Ivie chose to compromise her claim against

t..<.

0

----
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••

the tortfeasor by accepting the sum of $44,000 in
full settlement thereof o Prior to the settlement,
(the liability insurer) duly advised Ivie of its
intention to include (the no-fault carrier) on its
settlement draft and thereby satisfy its statutory
obligation to reimburse (the no-fault carrier) for
its advance of $7,394 in PIP payments. Indeed, at
the time of settlement, it issued a separate draft
for the exact sum of said PIP payments ($7,394),
payable jointly to Ivie and (the no-fault carrier)."
(Modified)
In referring to the dissent of Chief Justice Hall,
respondent is well aware that thoughtful and well reasoned
arguments exist in support of appellant's claimo

However, in

the event that the present Court wishes to lay down a new rule
of law, respondent would respectfully request the Court to
examine several important considerations.
Initially, it should be noted that the tort victim in
both

~'

supra, and the present case, acted without the benefit

of the Court's post-1980 pronouncements.

Respondents would con-

tend that to treat two similarly situated litigants in a disparate
fashion, would be an unfortunate inconsistency.

It is respect-

fully contended that should the Court choose to reexamine
supra, a better case would be presented by a post

!Y!!'

~,supra,

litiganto
Furthermore, respondents believe that the liability
insurer in the present case, is far less deserving of relief than
the liability carrier in !Y!!:.,supra.

As the Hall dissent indicates,

the liability insurer there attempted to satisfy the rights of the
no-fault's carrier by including it on the check that represented
special damages.

In the instant case, Allstate ac~~vely avoided

such a method.,
i

- 32 -
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Finally, if the above reasons are not persuasive, we
would urge that the Court treat Mrso Brundage in the same fashion
which Justice Hall urged the majority in
the liability carrier.

~'

supra, to give to

Justice Hall concluded his dissent by

stating:
"•ooapplying the new rule of law in the
present case eauses me c9nsiderablerconcern for
it effects a highly unjust and harsh result. The
majority would be better advised to abide by the
so-called "Sunburst Doctrine" and thereby make
the change in the law prospective only."
(Emphasis in the original)o

c.

The Allstate vs. Ivie Progeny

Respondent is also of the opinion that the pronouncements
of the Utah Supreme Court following

the-~

decision,- continue -

to support its position maintained on appeal •
.. In Allstate Insurance Company vso Anderson, 608 ·Po2d .235
(Utah 1980), an almost identical situation was presented.

The insured

received $2,000.00 in PIP benefits from its insurer, Allstateo

The

insured then brought an action against the tortfeasor which_ resulted
in a $10,000.00 settlement with the tortfeasor's insurer.

$2,000.00

of the $10,000.00 settlement was made payable jointly to Allstate
and the insured as reimbursement for the PIP benefits paid by
Allstate.

The insured tefused to deliver the draft to Allstate, and

Allstate then sued for its recovery.

The Court summarily granted

judgment in favor of the insurer holding that Ivie, supra, was dispositive of the case.
The same result should be reached in the present action.
Barbara Brundage received PIP benefits from the plaintiff of approximately $8313.80.

She then received a judgment against the tort-

feasor, Jacklyn L. Kernan, in an amount of $21,600.00.

In essence,
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-Ivie

and Anderson hold that while an insured tort victim should

not sue the tortfeasor for PIP payments already received, any
judgment or award which is given to the insured tort victim

from her insurer and her

is not recoverable by the victims insurer.
received $7,394000 in PIP payments

Thus, while Ivie

settlement with the tortfeasor's insurer was only $44,000oOO,
she was also granted judgment for the $7,394000 paid jointly
to her and her insurer, even though that amouµt was meant to be
reimbursement for the PIP benefits paid by her insurero

The

same result followed in Anderson where the insured tort victim
was awarded $2,000oOO meant to be PIP reimbursement to the insurer,
Finally, the additional consideration of attorney's fees
becomes relevant should the Court rule adversely to Mrs. Brundage,
In Street vs.

Farmer~.

Insurance Exchange, 609 Po 2d 1343 (Utah 1980), ,

the Court held:
"The general rule is that a subrogation insurance
carrier must pay its fair share of -attorney's fees
and costs if it has given notice and does nothing
to assist in the prosecution of the claim."
Therefore, should the Court choose to distinguish or
overrule the

~

decision, the ruling against respondents -Ivie

and Morgan would be subject to remand, in order to determine the
benefit conferred on the no-fault carrier.

See also Guaranty

National Insurance Company vs. Morris, 611 P.2d 725, 737, (Utah
1980)0

(This latter issue may be controlled by the case

of~

vs. State Farm Insurance Company now pending before the Court.
The Laub case was argued before the Court on the 14th day of June,
19820)
- 34 -
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CONCLUSION
The threshold consideration presented in this appeal is
whether respondents Brundage, Ivie and Morgan are properly before
the Court.

Respondents are of the opinion that personal jurisdiction

was never obtained after their dismissal from the suit

0

Therefore,

the errors assigned by Allstate following the dismissal of Ohio
Casualty's claim should have no effect on Mrso Brundage and her
attorneyso

Furthermore, the errors assigned by Allstate prior to

their dismissal involve only the rights of Ohio Casualty, which
have been waived. Thus, respondents conclude that the current appeal
is not properly before the Court.

This argument is considered as

being a form of special appearance, and the remainder of respondent's
brief is provided only to protect Mrso Brundage under all eventualities.
In addition, respondents are of the belief that the issue
presented here was conclusively determined at the conclusion of the
original action against the tortfeasor.

Respondents believe that

the appeal presented here is barred by the doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, timeliness, mootness, and as an impermissible
attempt to have one division of the Fourth District Court overrule
another.
Furthermore, respondents conclude that controlling case
law in the State of Utah on the question of insurance arbitration
and subrogation, would indicate that the appellant has no equitaole
rights of reimbursement against Mrs. Brundage or her attorneys.
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Finally, should the Court conclude that the present
case is ripe for a decision on the merits, and that modification
of Allstate vs. Ivie, supra, is in order, respondents would
respectfully request that the Court apply the Sunburst Doctrine,
and make the change in
Respectfully submitted this

- 36 -
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